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INTRODUCTION 
We are living in dark, dark times. In Europe and the United States, the 
institutions of interlocking governance and democratic coexistence that have been 
carefully nurtured since 1945 are under attack. Nationalism, tribalism, xenophobia, 
and racism are fueling right-wing populist revolts against this legal order despite the 
fact that the period since 1945 has seen rises in health, longevity, prosperity, and 
peace that are perhaps unparalleled in human history. 
Most fundamentally, we are in grave danger of losing sight of the core values 
that were forged out of the ashes of World War II and its unimaginable horrors. 
* Walter S. Cox Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. This Article was
prepared as part of a Symposium on Legal Pluralism held at the University of California, Irvine School
of Law. Some material derived from PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A 
JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS (2012).
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Those values include the very idea of democratic dialogue, international 
cooperation, protection of human rights, respect for diversity, the moral worth of 
each individual, the idea of limits on what nation-states can do to pursue their self-
interest, and so on. Witnessing the first two decades of the twenty-first century, it 
seems that those values, as well as the institutions needed to help protect them, may 
be far more fragile than perhaps most of us realized. And so they need to be 
articulated and defended, again and again. By everyone and anyone. 
Paradoxically and tragically, this move towards greater insularity and tribalism 
comes at a time when many of the problems facing the world increasingly require 
coordinated solutions and more interaction among legal and political systems, not 
less. Such problems include: issues of how we will effectively maintain life on this 
planet (climate change, biodiversity, ecosystem losses, and water deficits); issues of 
how human beings will sustain themselves on it (poverty, conflict prevention, and 
global infectious diseases); and issues of how we will develop global cooperative 
rules for living together given that much human activity crosses territorial borders 
(nuclear proliferation, toxic waste disposal, data protection, trade rules, finance and 
tax regimes, and so on). These sorts of problems cannot plausibly be addressed 
solely within one legal system. 
Yet, despite these obvious needs, we see resistance to global governance or 
universalistic solutions. This resistance may stem from concerns about the 
democratic accountability of such solutions or a belief that global solutions are 
intrinsically hegemonic. Indeed, an emphasis on the global might seem to give 
insufficient attention to the local affiliations and emotional attachments people at 
least sometimes hold onto most assiduously. Or universalism might be seen to 
trample on the ideal of diversity altogether. 
Thus, the legal challenge of our time is how to build mechanisms for 
engagement among legal, political, or cultural systems that recognize at least a 
limited set of shared values and promote mutual respect, dialogue, and cooperation, 
without requiring all systems to be homogenized into one universalistic legal order. 
We must create what David Held has called “the ethical and political space which 
sets out the terms of reference for the recognition of people’s equal moral worth, 
their active agency and what is required for their autonomy and development.”1 But 
at the same time, we must recognize that the meaning of principles such as equal 
concern and regard, human dignity, and so on cannot be specified once and for all, 
separate from the diversity of traditions, beliefs, histories, and cultures that make 
up human societies. In the end, what we need are institutions, procedures, and practices 
that allow for dialogue and cooperation under conditions of diversity. 
I believe legal pluralists should take up this challenge and help develop 
principles that might underlie the kinds of institutions, procedures, and practices 
that might be needed to perform this delicate balancing act. Indeed, scholars of legal 
pluralism are well positioned to understand the many ways in which legal systems 
 
1. DAVID HELD, COSMOPOLITANISM: IDEALS AND REALITIES 49 (2010). 
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and governmental institutions respond to the realities of diversity and the existence 
of multiple norm-generating communities operating simultaneously in the same 
social space. 
Legal pluralists have long recognized that societies consist of such multiple 
overlapping normative communities. These communities are sometimes state-based 
but sometimes not, and they are sometimes formal, official, and governmental, but 
again sometimes they are not. Scholars studying interactions among these multiple 
communities have often used the term “legal pluralism” to describe the inevitable 
intermingling of these normative systems.2 
In recent decades, a new application of pluralist insights has emerged in the 
international and transnational realm. This new legal pluralism research was born in 
the decades following the collapse of the bipolar Cold War order in 1989.3 During 
this period, it became clear that a single-minded focus on state-to-state relations or 
universal overarching norms was inadequate to describe the reality of the emerging 
global legal system, with its web of jurisdictional assertions by state, international, 
and non-state normative communities. As one commentator put it: 
The nation-state and the interstate system are the central political forms of 
the capitalist world system, and they will probably remain so for the 
foreseeable future. What has happened, however, is that they have become 
an inherently contested terrain, and this is the central new fact on which 
the analysis must focus: the state and the interstate system as complex 
social fields in which state and non-state, local and global social relations 
interact, merge and conflict in dynamic and even volatile combinations.4 
Legal pluralism provided a useful alternative framework because pluralism had 
always sought to identify hybrid legal spaces, where multiple normative systems 
occupied the same social field. And though pluralists had often focused on clashes 
within one geographical area, where formal bureaucracies encountered indigenous 
ethnic, tribal, institutional, or religious norms, the pluralist lens proved highly 
adaptive to analysis of the hybrid legal spaces created by a different set of 
overlapping jurisdictional assertions (state v. state, state v. international body, state 
v. non-state entity) in the global arena.5 
An emphasis on legal pluralism also freed scholars from endless intractable 
debates about whether international law is truly law given that coercive enforcement 
power in the international and transnational arena is often indirect or nonexistent. 
 
2. For a brief history of some of the key legal pluralism literature, see generally Paul Schiff 
Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 225 (2009). 
3. For a discussion of this literature, see generally Paul Schiff Berman, The Evolution of Global 
Legal Pluralism, in AUTHORITY IN TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY: THEORISING ACROSS 
DISCIPLINES (Roger Cotterrell & Maksymilian Del Mar eds., 2016). 
4. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW, 
GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 94 (2d ed. 2002). 
5. For a discussion of this trajectory in legal pluralism scholarship, see generally Paul Schiff 
Berman, From Legal Pluralism to Global Legal Pluralism, in LAW, SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY:  
SOCIO-LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROGER COTTERRELL 255 (Richard Nobles & David Schiff 
eds., 2014). 
First to Printer_Berman (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2018  10:42 AM 
152 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:149 
Such debates had created stagnation in the international law and international 
relations literature as both international law triumphalists and nation-state 
sovereigntists talked past each other with either an overly formalist faith in 
international law’s inherent authority, on the one hand, or an overly formalist 
rejection of any law beyond the nation-state, on the other. 
Global legal pluralism applies the insights of socio-legal scholarship and turns 
the gaze away from abstract questions of legitimacy and towards empirical questions 
of efficacy. Thus, pluralists de-emphasize the supposed distinctions between a 
norm, a custom, a law, a moral command, a sociological consensus, a psychological 
imperative, or the like. Instead, a pluralist approach focuses on both enacted law 
and what has sometimes been called “implicit” or “interactional” law, the purposive 
practices that groups of people enter into and that impact their practical sense of 
binding obligation.6 In addition, pluralists recognize that both enacted and 
interactional legal norms tend to seep into consciousness over time, such that the 
mere existence of these commands, whether enforced or not, may sometimes alter 
the power dynamics or options placed on the table in policy discussions. Thus, legal 
authority is always relative and always contested, and legal pluralists argue that our 
models for describing law should reflect that pluralism. 
As should be clear from this brief summary, legal pluralism has been primarily 
a descriptive enterprise. Anthropologists, historians, and other social scientists have 
generally seen legal pluralism as simply a reality, neither good nor bad, neither 
desirable nor undesirable. Instead, they have defined their task principally as an 
exercise in thick description: cataloging the inevitable hybridity that arises when 
multiple legal or quasi-legal systems occupy the same social space, as well as the 
resulting strategic interactions that occur among those navigating the various 
regimes. 
This is not to say, of course, that legal pluralism as a scholarly project was (or 
ever could be) devoid of implicit values and normative biases. Indeed, one might 
say that two strong normative undercurrents have always animated legal pluralism. 
First, legal pluralism was an attack on legal centralism, the idea that law was the sole 
province of the state and its formal institutions.7 Pluralists sought to undermine the 
assumption of state power, discovering agency and subversive opportunities among 
those presumed to be marginalized. As such, legal pluralism was a way of critiquing 
the power of the state and even at times celebrating resistance to state hegemony. 
Second, legal pluralism often had an implicit pro-local bias, particularly in its 
emphasis on forms of resistance to colonial state hegemony. Perhaps echoing cultural 
anthropology’s more general celebration of the local, legal pluralists tended to make 
the local, the indigenous, and the anti-colonial the heroes of the narrative. 
 
6. See WIBREN VAN DER BURG, THE DYNAMICS OF LAW AND MORALITY: A PLURALIST 
ACCOUNT OF LEGAL INTERACTIONISM 98–105 (2016) (drawing on theorist Lon Fuller to develop a 
theory of interactional law). 
7. See, e.g., John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL 
L. 1 (1986) (critiquing the “ideology of legal centralism”). 
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Nevertheless, even if we grant these implicit value preferences, legal pluralists, 
following most social scientists, generally have eschewed the sorts of strong 
normative arguments law professors routinely make: because of such-and-such 
research, we should now change legal or governmental systems in these particular 
ways. And there are surely virtues in focusing on thick description rather than 
normative prescription. Among other things, the constant pressure to produce 
“useful” work that will appeal to judges and policy-makers8 often forces legal 
academics into overly strong normative claims based on little evidence or an 
incomplete understanding of the complexity at work in social forces. One yearns 
for more effort to comprehend reality before switching to how best to reform it. 
And yet … 
I’d like to conduct a thought experiment. What might it mean for legal 
pluralists to play out some of the normative implications of their work for theories 
of law, policy, and institutional design? Do legal pluralists have something 
distinctive to add to contemporary law and governance debates? Or would asking 
such questions ultimately undermine the core insights of legal pluralism by 
committing scholars to particular modes of governance hierarchy? And if it did, is 
that a trade-off we can bear as scholars in exchange for policy relevance? And even 
if we were willing to make such a trade-off, is a legal pluralist position inherently in 
tension with any effort at systemic reform because legal pluralism recognizes that 
any system will always be partial, contested, and contingent? Or might systemic 
reform that is partial, contested, and contingent nevertheless be better than no 
reform at all? These are the questions I wish to ask here. 
Most fundamentally, I believe legal pluralists might be able to mount a clear-
throated defense of legal rules and governance institutions that foster interaction 
and dialogue among those multiple norm-generating communities rather than 
dissolving diversity either into universalism, on the one hand, or tribalism, on the 
other. And we need that defense right now, if only to name the values of diversity, 
dialogue, and communication across difference that are at the core of the world we 
might be on the brink of losing. 
My thought experiment begins with a brief summary of global legal pluralism’s 
descriptive project and why it better captures how law actually operates in the world 
than the traditional view offered by liberal legalism. Interestingly, legal pluralism’s 
descriptive account of law is now far less controversial than it once was, which in 
and of itself is an important advance. But then I ask whether we might push the 
envelope farther and think of legal pluralism as a normative project as well, one 
specifically aimed at identifying those procedures, institutions, and practices that 
provide frameworks for managing diversity without dissolving it into universality. 
And although managing diversity is in some sense also the goal of liberal legality, it 
may be that legal pluralism offers a distinctive and perhaps sometimes a more 
 
8. Austin Sarat & Susan Silbey have called this pressure the “pull of the policy audience.” Austin 
Sarat & Susan Silbey, The Pull of the Policy Audience, 10 L. & POL’Y 97 (1988). 
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effective approach. In order to construct such an approach, I consider various ways 
in which we might manage encounters with others, and I use Hannah Arendt’s 
model of “bearing with strangers” to think of how law might also build models of 
dialogue across difference rather than either walling difference off, on the one hand, 
or dissolving difference altogether, on the other. Next, I develop a set of principles 
that might be built into legal procedures, institutions, and practices that take 
seriously this pluralist approach. Finally, I draw on my own previous work to briefly 
summarize how such principles could actually be incorporated into legal 
institutions. 
In the end, it is clear that no legal or governance system will ever gain universal 
acquiescence. And legal pluralists, of all people, recognize that. So, the relevant 
normative question becomes whether we can create procedural mechanisms, 
institutions, and discursive practices that build dialogue across difference into the 
DNA of whatever legal or governance structure is being considered. And that is a 
normative project that legal pluralists are well-positioned to champion. 
I. GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM AS A DESCRIPTIVE PROJECT 
As a descriptive matter, global legal pluralism, like legal pluralism generally, 
represented an important alternative to liberal legalism. Pluralists, of course, are  
far more likely than traditional liberals even to notice the pluralism of legal and  
quasi-legal norms that exist apart from the state. After all, most liberal theorists 
begin their analysis with the state: how it is formed, how it is justified, and the 
philosophical underpinnings for its operations. Non-state actors are surely 
important to this inquiry in that they clash with the liberal state, and of course the 
state, under liberalism, should often reach positions of accommodation with these 
non-state actors. But what is being described is fundamentally the state and how it 
views the non-state. 
In contrast, pluralism assumes that the relevant inquiry is the entire range of 
legalities that course through the everyday experience of people. This means that 
the lived reality of communities and day-to-day perceptions of legitimacy and 
efficacy are far more important than philosophical models. In addition, a pluralist 
perspective is more likely to see individuals and groups, rather than just the state, as 
having agency and therefore playing crucial roles in navigating the interaction of 
normative systems and using those systems strategically. 
For example, in the classic colonial interaction, a quasi-liberal, state-based 
legality was layered on top of an indigenous legal system. A liberal theorist would 
focus on the newly imposed system and on how it either accommodated or refused 
to accommodate local communities. In contrast, pluralists would observe that the 
colonial system rarely, if ever, wipes out the indigenous system altogether, and they 
would then focus on the interaction of these legal systems and the ways in which 
local actors use both systems strategically to gain leverage. 
This is only one of many possible examples. But the point is that where 
liberalism only sees state legal systems and the challenges they face, pluralists focus 
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on interactions among legal systems. And global legal pluralism recognizes that  
nation-states must work within a framework of multiple overlapping jurisdictional 
assertions by state, international, and non-state communities. Each of these types 
of overlapping jurisdictional assertions creates a potentially hybrid legal space that 
is not easily eliminated and therefore creates contexts for yet more interactions. 
Just as important, pluralists are much less likely to insist on positivist 
definitions of law and are therefore more willing to notice law even in the absence 
of coercive power. This is especially significant in the global arena where statements 
of legal norms may be highly effective regardless of formal enforcement power.9 
For example, liberal sovereigntists sometimes insist that international, transnational, 
and non-state legal norms have no independent valence and that instead states 
simply pursue their own interests.10 In contrast, pluralists unpack the idea of a state 
interest, recognizing that conceptions of proper policy do not simply arise in a 
vacuum. Rather, they are developed by human beings operating with various sets of 
assumptions, ideas about justice, conceptions of global strategy, and beliefs about 
morality. These assumptions, ideas, and cognitive categories are themselves shaped 
in part by what socio-legal scholars have long termed legal consciousness. 
Accordingly, the legal norms that are “in the air” at any given moment of history—
including international, transnational, and non-state legal norms—may well affect 
how both policy makers and ordinary citizens think about the state’s interests.11 
Thus, legal pluralism provides a richer account of how law actually operates, 
both domestically and internationally, than the positivist vision of sovereigntism. 
We imbibe legal norms and cognitive categories even when we are not consciously 
aware of the norm in question. We are persuaded by legal norms even when those 
norms are not literally enforceable. We act in accordance with law because doing so 
has become habitual, not necessarily because we seek to avoid sanction. We 
conceive of our interrelations with others in terms of law because our long-term 
interests require that we do so, even when our short-term interest might seem to 
counsel otherwise. And the existence of a legal norm alters the constitutive terms 
of our relationships with others as well as the costs of noncompliance. All of these 
factors may be overcome in some circumstances. But the mere fact that legal norms 
are sometimes violated doesn’t mean that those norms have no constraining force 
at all. And only by thinking more broadly about changes in legal consciousness and 
the complicated social, political, and psychological factors that enter into the 
conceptualization of state interests can we begin to understand how non-state law 
operates. 
 
9. E.g., JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT (2010) (describing the ability of legal norms 
to promote adherence even in the absence of enforcement mechanisms). 
10. See generally JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2005). 
11. Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265 
(2006) (reviewing GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 10). 
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In addition, instead of treating the state as a unitary “personality” with a single 
set of interests, pluralists recognize that the real world is far messier, with a vast 
number of constituencies both within the governmental bureaucracy and outside it. 
This cacophony of voices is important because many of these voices, when 
advocating policy positions, can use the moral authority or persuasive power of 
international, transnational, and non-state norms for leverage. These norms 
therefore become a tool of empowerment for particular actors. And given that any 
state policy decision is inevitably the result of a contest among various bureaucratic 
power centers, all of which are themselves influenced by outside pressure groups, 
lobbyists, NGOs and the like, a more complex understanding of the global legal 
arena would need to explore ways in which plural legal norms empower specific 
interests both within and without the state policy-making apparatus. 
In short, global legal pluralism offers a more complicated descriptive account 
of the interaction of normative systems, the strategic action of individuals and 
groups in deploying these multiple systems to pursue their interests, and the subtle 
processes by which even norms without coercive power can change legal 
consciousness and have impact over time. These nuances are often elided in the 
traditional liberal legal analysis. 
II. FROM DESCRIPTIVE TO NORMATIVE 
Interestingly, as a descriptive enterprise, global legal pluralism is now quite 
uncontroversial (which I actually see as a great victory). Even the most die-hard 
legal positivist would now likely acknowledge that sub-, supra-, or non-state 
normative systems do impose real constraints that have real impacts. Thus, legal 
pluralists might be tempted simply to declare victory on the thick description front 
and stop there. 
And yet … 
If I think back to why I was first attracted to cultural anthropology as an 
undergraduate major it was more than the fact that it offered a richer descriptive 
account of the world. I was drawn to its celebration of possibility. If “the way things 
are” is not natural and inevitable, but instead culturally constructed and contingent, 
then that means alternatives are open to us. Likewise, legal pluralism is also in some 
sense a fundamental celebration of the values of diversity, multiplicity, compound 
and flexible identities, and resistance to the seemingly natural state of things. 
Consider the philosopher Iris Marion Young’s idea of “unassimilated 
otherness,” which she posited as the relation among people in the ideal 
“unoppressive city.”12 Young envisioned ideal city life as the “‘being-together’ of 
strangers.”13 These strangers may remain strangers and continue to “experience 
 
 12. See Iris Marion Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, in 
FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 300, 317 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990) (“Our political ideal is the 
unoppressive city.”). 
13. Id. at 318. 
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each other as other.”14 Indeed, they do not necessarily seek an overall group 
identification and loyalty. Yet, they are open to “unassimilated otherness.”15 They 
belong to various distinct groups or cultures and are constantly interacting with 
other groups. But, they do so without seeking either to assimilate or to reject those 
others. Such interactions instantiate an alternative kind of community,16 one that is 
never a hegemonic imposition of sameness but that nevertheless prevents different 
groups from ever being completely outside one another.17 In a city’s public spaces, 
Young argues, we see glimpses of this ideal: “The city consists in a great diversity 
of people and groups, with a multitude of subcultures and differentiated activities 
and functions, whose lives and movements mingle and overlap in public spaces.”18 
In this vision, there can be community without sameness, shifting affiliations 
without ostracism. 
This is the idealism I believe is at the core of global legal pluralism. And yet at 
this moment in history, that precise set of ideals is under attack. Indeed, if states can 
be hegemonic and oppressive, it seems clear that nationalists can be even more so. 
In Europe, we see a pushback against the loose integration of the European Union 
(EU) in favor of tribalism. This is particularly troubling because the decades since 
1945 have been by far the most peaceful and economically prosperous in Europe’s 
many centuries of history, and we should not allow the governance pluralism that 
characterizes the EU to be lightly tossed aside because of vague calls for border 
protection and nation-state sovereignty. At the same time, worldwide we see 
communities refusing to allow increased migration and diversification, and instead 
calling for more stringent policing of borders, the building of walls, and so on. And 
of course religious intolerance and sectarian prejudice fuels numerous conflicts 
around the world. Most recently, Donald Trump’s assault on all the institutions of 
democratic governance and the rise of the far right in Europe represent existential 
threats to the post World War II order and perhaps the ideal of democratic 
multiculturalism itself. All of these realities seem to me anathema to the pluralist 
project that called me to this field of study in the first place. 
Given this context, I feel that it is incumbent on me as an actor in the world 
to do more than just describe. I feel the need to engage with the flight from the 
ideals of diversity I see around us and to make the case for institutions that, however 
imperfectly, embed pluralist ideals and values into their design. And so, in the 
 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Young resists using the word “community” because of the “urge to unity” the term conveys 
but acknowledges that “[i]n the end it may be a matter of stipulation” whether one chooses to call her 
vision “community.” Id. at 320. See also Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 
1049 (1996) (“Unlike Young, I do not cede the term community to those who evoke the romance of 
togetherness.”). 
17. See Young, supra note 12, at 319 (positing that a group of strangers living side by side 
“instantiates social relations as difference in the sense of an understanding of groups and cultures that 
are different, with exchanging and overlapping interactions that do not issue in community, yet which 
prevent them from being outside of one another”). 
 18. Id. 
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remainder of this thought experiment, I am going to pursue what it might look like 
to think of global legal pluralism as an explicitly normative project. 
As a normative project, legal pluralism can be seen to support two different 
possible strategies. First, a proceduralist vision of legal pluralism aims to design 
procedural mechanisms, institutions, and discursive practices that seek to manage 
pluralism, without making a priori substantive decisions regarding when deference 
to alternative norms is appropriate and when it is not. Second, what we might call 
substantive legal pluralism seeks the best ways to accommodate, celebrate, and/or 
assimilate non-majoritarian populations and norms. Substantive legal pluralism is 
fundamentally a multiculturalist project and therefore shares strengths and 
weaknesses of multiculturalist political philosophy. Accordingly, I will focus more 
on the proceduralist vision, while offering a few tentative thoughts on substantive 
legal pluralism as well. Principally, I will defend the proceduralist vision of legal 
pluralism as a potentially useful design principle in creating legal and political 
institutions, procedural mechanisms, and governmental and non-governmental 
practices. 
III. LEGAL PLURALISM AND THE IDEA OF COMMUNICATION ACROSS 
DIFFERENCE 
If we start from the descriptive reality of legal pluralism—a world of inevitable 
interaction among multiple communities, normative stances, and legal regimes—
the operative question becomes: how might legal and governance systems respond 
to such a descriptive reality? 
This normative question leads in turn to fundamental questions about 
communication across difference, the reality of pluralism. Might we say that there 
are more desirable or less desirable ways to communicate across difference? 
So, then we can ask: How might we encounter the Other? How do we 
experience those who are different? Can we communicate? Can we live in parallel? 
Can we learn from those who are different? Can we ignore them? How do we 
manage the inevitable jostling that may arise? These are questions that are 
simultaneously psychological, sociological, political, and legal and, therefore, should 
be addressed on many different levels at once. 
One possible response to the encounter with the Other is to focus on those 
attributes that make the Other not so different at all. This is the “we’re all 
fundamentally the same” gambit we hear so often. And, interestingly, this focus on 
sameness can be adopted both by die-hard nationalists—who use it to insist that 
“our” norms (whoever the “our” might be) should govern all—and committed 
universalists, who use it to push for uniform norms operating cross-culturally 
throughout space and time. 
In this same vein, some sociological studies of communication start from the 
idea that interpersonal interaction requires both parties in an encounter to believe 
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(or at least assume) that the Other is not truly Other at all.19 According to this view, 
most associated with Alfred Schutz, differences in individual perspectives are 
overcome only if each party tacitly believes that he or she could effectively trade 
places with the other. As Schutz describes it, “I am able to understand other 
people’s acts only if I can imagine that I myself would perform analogous acts if I 
were in the same situation[.]”20 Thus, differences in perspective are reduced to 
differences in situation. Any, possibly more fundamental, differences are suppressed 
to facilitate dialogue. 
As a result, the deliberate assuming away of the unfamiliar is seen as a constant 
part of everyday life. The unfamiliar is relegated to the category of “strange,” and 
“strangeness” necessarily is placed elsewhere, somewhere other than the interaction 
at hand.21 Indeed, Harold Garfinkel and other ethnomethodologists have argued 
that individuals do not simply passively maintain these assumptions but are 
constantly engaged in a joint enterprise aimed at sustaining this familiarity.22 In all 
of these studies, the emphasis is on “the human production of common worlds of 
meaning as the only axis on which dialogue rotates.”23 
But is that all there is to the experience of the Other? Is it really imperative 
constantly to assume that our fellow human beings are fundamentally identical to 
us? After all, “[u]nder this principle, if a dialogue is to take place, strangeness as a 
phenomenon of everyday interaction must be considered negatively, namely, as that 
part of an encounter that must be constantly ‘assumed away’ by the participants.”24 
Thus, we are left with a world in which people are classified either as familiar or as 
strangers. Even more problematic, these studies suggest that it will be simply 
impossible to bridge the communication gap with those deemed strangers. Yet, as 
Georg Simmel noted long ago, the stranger is never truly distant,25 so there will need 
to be some way of bridging gaps short of assuming away strangeness altogether. 
On the other hand, we might respond to such encounters with the Other by 
retreating to a gated community and trying to lead a hermetically sealed existence. 
Here, the Other remains fully Other, and no communication is possible. 
 
19. See generally Z.D. Gurevitch, The Other Side of Dialogue: On Making the Other Strange and 
the Experience of Otherness, 93 AM. J. SOC. 1179 (1988) (criticizing the idea that mutual understanding 
and communication in interpersonal communications is contingent on assuming commonality between 
Self and Other). 
20. ALFRED SCHUTZ, ON PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS 181 (Helmut  
R. Wagner ed., 1970). 
21. Gurevitch, supra note 19, at 1180 (summarizing arguments in ALFRED SCHUTZ, 
COLLECTED PAPERS I: THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL REALITY (Maurice Natanson ed., 1962)). 
22. See, e.g., Harold Garfinkel, Studies of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities, 11  
SOC. PROBS. 225 (1964). 
23. Gurevitch, supra note 19, at 1180. 
24. Id. at 1181–82. 
 25. See e.g., GEORG SIMMEL, The Stranger, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 402 (Kurt 
H. Wolff ed., 1950). 
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Both of these responses, when translated to law, are fundamentally 
“jurispathic.”26 They kill off competing interpretations by authoritatively saying that 
this is the law and that is not. So, either a single nation-state’s norms govern, or one 
universal law governs. Such jurispathic legal assertions may sometimes be effective, 
necessary, or desirable, but they are not the only ways to structure legal relations 
among multiple communities. Indeed, they both represent a fundamental retreat 
from pluralism. Yet, pluralism is difficult to escape in a world of overlapping 
jurisdictions and normative diversity, where—as the classic formulation goes—
multiple conflicting legal systems occupy the same social field. The question 
therefore becomes: are there other approaches to managing pluralism? Can we 
develop a more pluralist governance approach? What are the institutional or 
procedural or discursive principles we might apply? 
Unlike the universalist approach, a pluralist vision does not require people to 
be conceptualized as fundamentally identical in order to be brought within the same 
normative system. Nor does a pluralist vision render outsiders irrelevant, as 
sovereignist territorialism does. Instead, pluralism attempts to navigate a different 
path altogether. A pluralist frame asks whether we can seek solutions without 
assuming commonality or seek harmonization while preserving the insistence on 
difference that contextualists rightly emphasize. In short, pluralism questions 
whether we are doomed either to require commonality or to essentialize difference. 
Are those truly the only possible approaches? 
Think again of how we encounter a stranger. Do we necessarily see that 
stranger only in binary terms, either as fundamentally the same as we are or as 
fundamentally different? Might not we see (and celebrate) important differences 
while seeking ways to bridge those gaps so that we might communicate with each 
other and live peaceably side by side? 
Perhaps we might draw from Hannah Arendt, who offers a different way of 
conceptualizing the encounter with the stranger. Instead of assuming commonality, 
she seeks, in Understanding and Politics, the quality that “makes it bearable for us to 
live with other people, strangers forever, in the same world, and makes it possible 
for them to bear with us.”27 Note that for Arendt, the task is how to “bear with” 
strangers, even while recognizing that they will forever be strange.28 Arendt’s 
strategy for bearing with strangers is more than just mutual indifference and more 
than just toleration as well. It “involves a mental capacity appropriate for an active 
relation to that which is distant,”29 which Arendt locates in King Solomon’s gift of 
 
26. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 53 (1983) (describing judges as “jurispathic” because their interpretations “kill” off 
competing normative assertions). 
27. HANNAH ARENDT, Understanding and Politics (The Difficulties of Understanding), in ESSAYS 
IN UNDERSTANDING: 1930–1954, at 307, 322 ( Jerome Kohn ed., 1994). 
28. In focusing on Arendt’s idea of “bearing with strangers,” I draw from the analysis in Phillip 
Hansen, Hannah Arendt and Bearing with Strangers, 3 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY 3 (2004). 
29. Id. at 3. 
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the “understanding heart.”30 Understanding, according to Arendt, “is the 
specifically human way of being alive; for every single person needs to be reconciled 
to a world into which he was born a stranger and in which, to the extent of his 
distinct uniqueness, he always remains a stranger.”31 What does “understanding” 
entail for Arendt? This is a bit difficult to pin down, but she makes clear that 
understanding is not gained through direct experience of the Other, and it is not 
just knowledge of the Other.32 Instead, understanding starts from the individual 
situated apart from others. Thus, instead of “feeling your pain,” understanding 
involves determining what aspects of the pain people feel have to do with politics 
and “what politics can do to resolve our common dilemmas.”33 Moreover, 
“[u]nderstanding can be challenged and is compelled to respond to an alternative 
argument or interpretation.”34 In short, understanding in Arendt’s formulation 
looks a lot less like empathy and a lot more like judging.35 
While assuming sameness leads to a universalist harmonization approach, 
Arendt’s more distanced conception of the encounter with the stranger is akin to 
the pluralist vision I am pursuing as an alternative. This is also Young’s conception 
of “unassimilated otherness,” in the ideal “unoppressive city.”36 It is the 
“‘being-together’ of strangers.”37 
IV. BUILDING A NORMATIVE GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM 
With this alternative frame in mind, here’s an initial cut at translating such a 
pluralist vision into an overarching normative approach, one that seeks a middle 
ground between sovereigntist territorialism and tribalism on the one hand and 
universalism on the other. In this vision, the relevant question becomes: How might 
legal, governmental, or non governmental systems seek to create or preserve spaces for productive 
interaction among multiple, overlapping communities and legal systems by developing 
procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices that aim to bring those communities and 
systems into dialogue rather than dictating norms hierarchically? 
This question implies a set of principles for institutional design. Significantly, 
these principles are not derived from any overarching universal set of truths and do 
not require a commitment to universalism. They only require a pragmatic 
willingness to engage with other possible normative systems and potentially to 
restrain one’s own jurispathic voice for the sake of forging more workable, longer-
lasting relationships and harmony among multiple communities. Sometimes, of 
course, such deference to the Other will not be possible; a proceduralist vision of 
 
 30. ARENDT, supra note 27, at 322. 
 31. Id. at 308. 
32. See id. at 313. 
 33. Jean Bethke Elshtain, Judging Rightly, 47 FIRST THINGS 49, 49 (1994) (reviewing ARENDT, 
supra note 27). 
34. Id. 
 35. See ARENDT, supra note 27, at 313. 
36. Young, supra note 12. 
37. Id. at 318. 
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legal pluralism only seeks to embed habitual practices in which deference is considered 
and attempted, not in which it is always implemented. Let’s see what some of these 
institutional principles might be. 
First, a more pluralist approach to managing hybrid legal spaces should not 
attempt to erase the reality of that hybridity. Indeed, arguably the desire to “solve” 
hybridity problems is precisely what has made conflict of laws such a conceptually 
unsatisfying field for so long. Each generation seeks a new way (or often the revival 
of an old way) to divine an answer to what is at its root an unanswerable question: 
which territorially based state community’s norms should govern a dispute that, by 
definition, is not easily situated territorially and necessarily involves affiliations with 
multiple communities? 
Second, a pluralist framework recognizes that normative conflict is 
unavoidable and so, instead of trying to erase conflict, seeks to manage it through 
procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices that might at least draw the 
participants to the conflict into a shared social space. This approach draws on 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s idea that agreements are reached principally through 
participation in common forms of life, rather than through agreement on 
substance.38 Or, as the political theorist Chantal Mouffe has put it, we need to 
transform “enemies”—who have no common symbolic space—into 
“adversaries.”39 Adversaries, according to Mouffe, are “friendly enemies”: friends 
because they “share a common symbolic space but also enemies because they want 
to organize this common symbolic space in a different way.”40 Ideally, law—and 
particularly pluralist legal mechanisms—can function as the sort of common 
symbolic space that Mouffe envisions and can therefore play a constructive role in 
transforming enemies into adversaries. This is akin to Young’s ideal city. 
Of course, Mouffe might well disagree with my application of her idea to law. 
Indeed, in The Democratic Paradox, she writes that “one cannot oppose, as so many 
liberals do, procedural and substantial justice without recognizing that procedural 
justice already presupposes acceptance of certain values.”41 Her point is well taken; 
certainly, my focus on procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices 
necessarily limits the range of pluralism somewhat because it requires participants 
to accept the principles underlying the values of procedural pluralism itself. This is, 
to a large extent, a vision consonant with liberal principles, and many may reject it 
on that basis. Alas, there is no way to extricate oneself from this concern if one 
wants to have any type of functioning legal system for negotiating normative 
difference. Thus, I argue only that a pluralist framework is more likely to draw 
participants together into a common social space than a territorialist or universalist 
framework would. As philosopher Stuart Hampshire has argued, because normative 
 
38. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS para. 241, at 88  
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1967). 
 39. CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 13 (2000). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 68. 
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agreement is impossible, “[f]airness and justice in procedures” are the only virtues 
that offer even the possibility for broader sharing.42 Accordingly, the key is to create 
spaces for such broader sharing, spaces for turning enemies into adversaries, 
without insisting on normative agreement.43 
Third, to help create this sort of shared social space, procedural mechanisms, 
institutions, and practices for managing pluralism should encourage decision-
makers to wrestle explicitly with questions of multiple community affiliation and 
the effects of activities across territorial borders, rather than shunting aside 
normative difference. As a result, a pluralist framework invites questions that 
otherwise might not be asked: How are communities appropriately defined in 
today’s world? To what degree do people act on the basis of affiliations with non-
state or supranational communities? How should the various norm-generating 
communities in the global system interact so as to provide opportunities for 
contestation and expression of difference? Such questions must be considered 
carefully to develop mechanisms that will take seriously the multifaceted 
interactions of such communities. 
Thus, a pluralist conception makes no attempt to deny the multi-rooted nature 
of individuals within a variety of communities, both territorial and nonterritorial. 
Accordingly, although a pluralist conception might acknowledge the potential 
importance of asserting universal norms in specific circumstances, it does not 
require a universalist belief in a single world community. As a result, pluralism offers 
a promising rubric for analyzing law in a world of diverse normative voices. 
Fourth, thinking in pluralist terms forces consideration of values inherent in a 
smoothly functioning trans-community legal order, what Justice Blackmun called 
“the systemic value of reciprocal tolerance and goodwill.”44 For example, in the 
United States, courts give full faith and credit to judgments rendered in other states 
even if those judgments could never have been issued by the crediting state.45 Thus, 
the value of respecting an interlocking national system outweighs the individual 
parochial interests of the crediting state. Such considerations should always be part 
of any mechanism for addressing the overlap of plural legal systems. Moreover, 
 
 42. STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT 53 (2000). 
43. Cf. Jeremy Waldron, Tribalism and the Myth of the Framework, in KARL POPPER: CRITICAL 
APPRAISALS 203, 221 (Philip Catton & Graham Macdonald eds., 2004) (“Humans are enormously 
curious about each other’s ideas and reasons, and, when they want to be, they are resourceful in listening 
to and trying to learn from one another across what appear to be barriers of cultural comprehensibility, 
often far beyond what philosophers and theorists of culture give them credit for.”). 
44. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
45. See, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948) (stating that the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
“ordered submission . . . even to hostile policies reflected in the judgment of another State, because the 
practical operation of the federal system, which the Constitution designed, demanded it”). See also 
Milwaukee Cty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935) (“In numerous cases this court has held 
that credit must be given to the judgment of another state, although the forum would not be required 
to entertain the suit on which the judgment was founded[.]”); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 
(1908) (stating that the judgment of a Missouri court was entitled to full faith and credit in Mississippi 
even if the Missouri judgment rested on a misapprehension of Mississippi law). 
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taking account of these sorts of systemic values should be seen as a necessary part 
of how communities pursue their interests in the world, not as a restraint on 
pursuing such interests. After all, if it is true that communities cannot exist in 
isolation from one another, then there is a long-term parochial benefit from not 
insisting on narrow parochial interest and, instead, establishing mechanisms for 
trying to defer to others’ norms where possible. 
Fifth, even a system that respects such inter-systemic values will, of course, 
sometimes find a particular foreign norm to be such an anathema that the norm 
will not be enforced.46 Or, a local religious practice may be so contrary to state 
values that it will be deemed illegal.47 Or, creating a zone of autonomy for a 
particular minority group might so threaten the stability of the larger community 
that it cannot be countenanced. Thus, embracing pluralism in no way requires a full 
embrace of illiberal communities and practices or the recognition of autonomy 
rights for every minority group across the board. But when such “public policy” 
exceptions are invoked within a pluralist framework, they should be treated as 
unusual occasions requiring strong normative statements regarding the contours of 
the public policy.48 This means that, as Robert Cover envisioned, a jurispathic act 
that “kills off” another community’s normative commitment is always at least 
accompanied by an equally strong normative commitment.49 The key point is to 
make decision-makers self-conscious about their sometimes necessary jurispathic 
actions.50 Only such an approach has any chance of preventing adversaries from 
turning into enemies. 
Finally, a pluralist framework must always be understood as a middle ground 
between tribalism, on the one hand, and universalism, on the other. The key, 
therefore, is to try to articulate and maintain a balance between these two poles. As 
such, successful mechanisms, institutions, or practices will be those that 
simultaneously celebrate both local variation and international order, and recognize 
the importance of preserving both multiple sites for contestation and an 
interlocking system of reciprocity and exchange. Of course, actually doing that in 
difficult cases is a Herculean and perhaps impossible task. Certainly, mutual 
 
46. For example, a liberal legal order might refuse to enforce a judgment issued by an 
authoritarian ruler or a court system that does not adhere to fundamental norms of due process. 
47. For example, a religious practice that violates fundamental norms of equality may get less 
deference from a liberal legal order than one that does not. 
 48. See, e.g., Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (requiring courts to enforce the judgment or arbitral award 
unless the agreement is null and void, inoperative, incapable of being performed, or if enforcing it 
would be repugnant to the public policy of the enforcing forum). 
49. See Cover, supra note 26 (describing judges as inevitably “people of violence” because their 
interpretations “kill” off competing normative assertions). 
50. See Judith Resnik, Living Their Legal Commitments: Paideic Communities, Courts, and Robert 
Cover (An Essay on Racial Segregation at Bob Jones University, Patrilineal Membership Rules, Veiling, 
and Jurisgenerative Practices), 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 17, 25 (2005) (“[Cover] wanted the state’s 
actors . . . to be uncomfortable in their knowledge of their own power, respectful of the legitimacy of 
competing legal systems, and aware of the possibility that multiple meanings and divergent practices 
ought sometimes to be tolerated, even if painfully so.”). 
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agreement about contested normative issues is unlikely and, as discussed previously, 
possibly even undesirable. Thus, the challenge is to develop ways to seek mutual 
accommodation while keeping at least some “play” in the joints so that diversity is 
respected as much as possible. Such play in the joints also allows for the 
jurisgenerative possibilities inherent in having multiple lawmaking communities and 
multiple norms.51 Always, the focus is on trying to forge the sort of shared social 
space that Mouffe describes for transforming enemies into adversaries and Young 
describes as the ideal city. 
Taken together, these principles provide a set of normative criteria for 
evaluating the ways in which legal systems interact. In addition, the principles could 
inform a community (whether state-based or not) that wishes to design 
mechanisms, institutions, or practices for addressing plural assertions of norms. Of 
course, as discussed above, such criteria are not exclusive. For example, a procedure 
or practice that manages pluralism well but denies certain norms of fundamental 
justice might be deemed problematic, regardless of its embrace of pluralism. Thus, 
my goal is not to say that embracing pluralism always overrides other concerns. 
After all, as mentioned previously, many legal and quasi-legal orders are repressive 
and profoundly illiberal, and their norms may be resisted on those grounds. Instead, 
the important point is simply that pluralist considerations should always at least be 
part of the constitutional design, inculcating habits of mind that promote deference 
and restraint. Accordingly, decision-makers should always ask: Are there other 
normative systems at play here? Should I restrain my jurispathic voice? Is there some 
other decision-maker who might more appropriately speak to this issue? Are there 
ways I could develop a hybrid decisional framework that brings more voices to the 
table? And how can I design ongoing practices, procedures, or institutional 
arrangements to constitutionally embed these inquiries? 
V. SIX MECHANISMS FOR MANAGING LEGAL PLURALISM 
A. Dialectical Legal Interactions 
If the idea of managing, without eliminating, pluralism is your frame, then 
projects like the European Union become not a failure (as we often hear), but 
something closer to the ideal, at least in conception if not in every detail. Indeed, 
while universalists complain that Europe should have a stronger commitment to 
centralized solutions and nation-state sovereigntists complain that Belgian 
bureaucrats threaten state autonomy, a normative vision of legal pluralism suggests 
that the EU’s institutional apparatus has important benefits in its balance of both 
positions and its efforts to accommodate both universalism and sovereigntist 
territorialism at the same time. 
 
 51. See SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM 49 (Robert Post ed. 2006) 
(discussing and defining “jurisgenerative processes”). 
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Thus, while constitutions traditionally try to demarcate clear hierarchical lines 
of authority among different decision-makers, a more pluralist constitutional design 
might, instead, create increased opportunities for dialectical legal interactions. For 
instance, as noted previously, some who study international law fail to find real 
“law” in the international realm because they are looking for hierarchically based 
commands backed by coercive power.52 In contrast, a pluralist approach 
understands that interactions among various tribunals and regulatory authorities are 
more likely to take on a dialectical quality that is neither the direct hierarchical review 
traditionally undertaken by appellate courts, nor simply the dialogue that often 
occurs under the doctrine of comity.53 
Consider, for example, interactions between the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) and the constitutional courts of European member states. Here, the 
relationship may seem hierarchical because, over the past several decades, the 
ECHR has increasingly come to seem like a supranational constitutional court, and 
its authority as ultimate arbiter of European human rights disputes has largely been 
accepted.54 Yet, even in this context there appears to be more room for pluralism 
than is typical in hierarchical legal systems. As Nico Krisch has documented, 
domestic courts occasionally refuse to follow ECHR judgments, asserting 
fundamental principles embedded in their own constitutional order and, in general, 
claiming the power to determine the ultimate limits to be placed on the authority of 
the ECHR.55 Typical of this dialectical relationship is the statement by the German 
Constitutional Court that ECHR judgments have to be “taken into account” by 
German courts but may have to be “integrated” or adapted to fit the domestic legal 
system.56 Moreover, the German Court has gone so far as to say that ECHR 
decisions must be disregarded altogether if they are “contrary to German 
constitutional provisions.”57 
Yet, although such statements make it sound as if conflict between the ECHR 
and domestic courts is the norm, the reality has actually been quite harmonious. As 
Krisch points out, “despite national courts’ insistence on their final authority, the 
normal, day-to-day operation of the relationship with the [ECHR] has lately been 
highly cooperative, and friction has been rare.”58 The picture that emerges is one in 
which domestic courts and the ECHR engage in a series of both informal and 
interpretive mutual accommodation strategies to maintain a balance between 
uniformity and dissention. Likewise, as Lisa Conant has observed, nation-state 
 
 52. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 10. 
53. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National Courts, 
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029 (2004), for a detailed analysis of such dialectical regulation. 
54. See generally Nico Krisch, The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law, 71  
MOD. L. REV. 183 (2008) (discussing the evolution of the European human rights regime while tracing 
the interaction of the European Court of Human Rights with domestic courts in the European Union). 
55. See generally id. 
56. Id. at 196. 
57. Id. at 196–97. 
58. Id. at 197. 
First to Printer_Berman (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2018  10:42 AM 
2018] GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM 167 
courts have sought to “contain” the impact of European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
decisions on national legal orders, even while formally accepting both the 
supremacy of EU law and the ECJ’s role in authoritatively interpreting that law.59 
These sorts of dialectical relationships, forged and developed over many years, may 
well reflect a workable path for the many other intersystemic interactions at play in 
the world today. 
For another example, consider the Canadian Constitution, which explicitly 
contemplates a dialectical interaction between national courts and provincial 
legislatures concerning constitutional interpretation. Section 33’s so-called 
“notwithstanding” clause permits Parliament or a provincial legislature to authorize 
the operation of a law for a five-year period, even after it has been declared invalid 
by a court.60 As with the ECHR example, this provision potentially has a disciplining 
effect on the court and encourages a more nuanced iterative process in working out 
constitutional norms. It is true of course that the notwithstanding clause, though 
often invoked rhetorically, has only rarely actually been used by provincial 
governments to continue a judicially invalidated law.61 Yet, this relative infrequency 
of use may not be evidence of a failed constitutional innovation. Instead, it may 
indicate just the opposite: that the various institutional actors have sufficiently 
internalized this mechanism for managing hybridity such that, as in the ECHR 
example, the precipice is rarely reached.62 
In contrast to the dialectical interplay contemplated by the “notwithstanding 
clause,” the U.S. Supreme Court has, on multiple occasions, interpreted the U.S. 
Constitution to contain an implicit foreign affairs preemption doctrine that cuts off 
such interplay.63 For example, the Court has refused to allow localities to take 
 
 59. See LISA CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
3 (2002). 
60. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, c. 11, § 33 (U.K.). 
61. For example, the Quebec Parliament overrode the Canadian Supreme Court’s invalidation 
of provisions of a language law. See Ford v. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (Can.). However, outside 
Quebec the notwithstanding clause has never been used to overturn a judicial decision. See James Allan 
& Grant Huscroft, Constitutional Rights Coming Home to Roost? Rights Internationalism in American 
Courts, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 21 (2006). In addition, according to one account, the clause has been 
disavowed by successive prime ministers because “[i]ts use has come to be seen as undermining the 
Charter, in part because judicial decisions interpreting the Charter have come to be seen as synonymous 
with the Charter itself.” Id. at 20. 
62. On the other hand, it is possible that “the notwithstanding clause frees Canadian courts to 
be less deferential to elected legislatures than they otherwise would have been in the absence of such a 
clause, because it allows judges to act on the basis that their decisions are not final.” Allan & Huscroft, 
supra note 61, at 21–22 (emphasis added). In any event, the important point for our purposes is that the 
clause is structured as a mechanism for managing the hybridity of multiple communities within a federal 
system. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights and Constitutionalism, 7 J. HUM. RTS. 139, 147–48 
(2008), for an account supporting the approach of the notwithstanding clause from the perspective of 
political theory. 
 63. See, e.g., American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (striking down California 
law requiring insurance companies doing business in California to disclose any business activities in 
Europe during the Nazi Holocaust); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) 
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actions that were deemed to encroach upon the exclusive national prerogative to 
conduct foreign affairs.64 Yet, one might think that “[in our] democratic 
federation . . . local efforts to effectuate protection of rights have a presumptive 
validity” authorized by the commitments to multiple voices protected in a federal 
system.65 At the very least, courts should carefully interrogate the claimed 
justification for preemption to ensure that the local action at issue poses a real, 
rather than conjectural, threat to the federal government’s conduct.66 After all, 
pluralism is built into the structure of federalism, and so actions of localities to 
import international or foreign norms or signal solidarity with them should not 
easily be displaced. 
Indeed, at times we can see the explicit creation of dialectical legal regimes to 
manage federalist interactions. For example, take California’s efforts to impose 
more stringent automobile fuel efficiency standards than the federal government’s 
standards.67 At first glance, this might seem to be simply a direct state challenge to 
federal authority. However, the entire regime under which California can apply for 
a waiver to impose stricter standards is itself a creature of federal law because it is 
the Clean Air Act that grants California the special status in regulating automobile 
emissions68 and that arguably has contributed to California’s regulatory leadership 
in this area.69 Similarly, the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act established a 
formal mechanism whereby northeastern states were granted the ability to 
cooperate in the control of ozone, but the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
was given the power to approve or disapprove any recommendations the 
consortium might have.70 
Significantly, these provisions, both of which explicitly create formalized 
dialectical (or multiscalar) relations between state and federal authority, may be 
preferable to a regime that grants either the states or the federal government sole 
 
(prohibiting Massachusetts from banning state expenditures on goods and services from any person 
that had been in business with Burma); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (striking down Oregon 
statute that had the effect of preventing a resident of East Germany from inheriting property probated 
in the state); see also Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and 
Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31 (2007), for a 
discussion of these cases. 
64. See supra note 63. 
 65. Resnik, supra note 50, at 85. 
66. See id. at 87 (“[ J ]udges ought to adopt a posture of non-encroachment by insisting on exacting 
evidence of particular and specific imminent harms before invalidating actions by localities or by states 
as those entities determine their own expenditures of funds and rules.”). 
67. Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1128 
(2009). 
 68. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(A) (2006). 
69. See Carlson, supra note 67, at 1109 (2009) (“California’s leadership on climate change issues 
is not merely the product of state leadership. California’s climate change regulations are a direct result 
of federal law, which has played a central role both in allowing the state to regulate and in demanding 
stricter regulation of air pollution.”). 
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511c(a) (2012). 
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authority.71 As Ann Carlson argues, the federal statutes have, as an initial matter, 
tended to encourage the states to ratchet up their environmental protection beyond 
what they otherwise might have done.72 However, the dialectical scheme has gone 
further and actually encouraged the deputized states to become leaders on 
environmental compliance.73 Moreover, by granting such authority to only one state 
or to a small group of states, the dialectical scheme reaps the benefits of permitting 
a greater field for experimentation than a top-down solution would ordinarily 
provide, while at the same time achieving greater national uniformity than would 
occur if each state were free to go its own way. Thus, the pluralist approach of these 
provisions walks a middle ground between fully decentralized and fully centralized 
power and arguably achieves a better outcome than either. 
Likewise, the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007 was a federal 
statute that authorized states to divest from companies doing business in Sudan, but 
only under certain conditions and in limited ways, and only until the President 
certified that the human rights abuses committed by Sudan have eased.74 Again, the 
federal restrictions addressed concerns about national uniformity in foreign affairs, 
but the Act did not embrace the jurispathic doctrine of foreign affairs preemption, 
under which the U.S. Supreme Court altogether foreclosed Massachusetts’s efforts 
to divest from companies doing business in Burma.75 Instead, the pluralist approach 
of the statute provided a port of entry for states to contribute to the formulation of 
national foreign policy while guarding against complete devolution of foreign affairs 
power. As Perry Bechky observed: 
[S]tate divestment may call attention to an under-attended concern, 
influence societal attitudes about that concern, and build domestic political 
support for a more vigorous national response thereto. Congress may 
reasonably conclude that it wishes to hear state speech about Darfur as it 
continually reassesses the degree of priority to afford Darfur amongst the 
many concerns competing for Congressional attention.76 
Accordingly, the statutory scheme provided greater opportunity for intersystemic 
dialogue, public debate, and creative norm generation by multiple actors than if 
either a localist or nationalist solution had fully triumphed. 
These examples all involve dialectical interactions between formal state or 
international legal institutions. However, the same dialectical interactions are 
possible with regard to non-state normative standards. For example, the decisions 
of arbitral panels may, over time, exert influence on the decisions of more formal 
 
71. See generally Hari M. Osofsky, The Future of Environmental Law and Complexities of Scale: 
Federalism Experiments with Climate Change Under the Clean Air Act, 32 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 79 
(2010) (suggesting ways for these multiscalar approaches to evolve in light of changing environmental 
law demands). 
 72. See Carlson, supra note 67, at 1100–01. 
73. See id. at 1101, 1134–35. 
74. See Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, 121 Stat. 2516. 
75. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
76. Perry S. Bechky, Darfur, Divestment, and Dialogue, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 823, 826 (2009). 
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state or international bodies, and vice versa. In a different context, states may 
incorporate or adapt standards of conduct that are part of accreditation schemes 
promulgated by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or industry groups, or 
industry standards promulgated by trade associations or other quasi-regulatory 
bodies.77 And more broadly, we might see the creation of monitoring schemes in 
general as a kind of pluralist approach because instead of dictating rules, such 
monitoring generates oversight and publicity that can instigate change without a 
formal hierarchical relationship or coercive enforcement. 
B.  Margins of Appreciation 
One of the interpretive mechanisms employed by the ECHR to maintain space 
for local variation is the oft-discussed “margin of appreciation” doctrine.78 Unlike 
the dialectical legal encounter between the ECHR and the German Constitutional 
Court described above, the margin of appreciation doctrine is an explicit 
interpretive device employed by the ECHR to give play to local variation. The idea 
here is to strike a balance between deferring to national courts and legislators, on 
the one hand, and maintaining “European supervision” that “empower[s the 
ECHR] to give the final ruling” on whether a challenged practice is compatible with 
the European Convention on Human Rights, on the other.79 Thus, the margin of 
appreciation allows domestic polities some room to maneuver in implementing 
ECHR decisions in order to accommodate local variation. How big that margin is 
depends on a number of factors, including the degree of consensus among the 
member states. For example, in a case involving parental rights of transsexuals, the 
ECHR noted that because there was as yet no common European standard, and 
“generally speaking, the law appears to be in a transitional stage, the respondent 
State must be afforded a wide margin of appreciation.”80 
Affording this sort of variable margin of appreciation usefully accommodates 
a limited range of pluralism. It does not permit domestic courts to ignore fully the 
supranational pronouncement (though, as discussed previously, domestic courts 
have sometimes asserted greater independence). Nevertheless, it does allow space 
for local variation, particularly when the law is in transition or when no consensus 
 
77. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,  
618–19 (2000) (describing government incorporation of accreditation standards on health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs) first promulgated by nongovernmental entities); see also LAURA A. DICKINSON, 
OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE: PRESERVING PUBLIC VALUES IN A WORLD OF PRIVATIZED 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 92–95 (2011) (proposing such an accreditation scheme for disciplining private 
military contractors). 
 78. See generally Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 316–17 (1997), for a particularly useful, succinct 
summary. My discussion here largely tracks theirs. 
79. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245, 276 (1979). 
80. X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 21830/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143, 144 (1997); see also Otto-
Preminger Inst. v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34, 57–58 (1994) (finding that the 
lack of a uniform European conception of rights to freedom of expression “directed against the 
religious feelings of others” dictates a wider margin of appreciation). 
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exists among member states on a given issue. Moreover, by framing the inquiry as 
one of local consensus, the margin of appreciation doctrine disciplines the ECHR 
and forces it to move incrementally, pushing toward consensus without running too 
far ahead of it. 
Finally, the margin of appreciation functions as a signaling mechanism, 
through which “the ECHR is able to identify potentially problematic practices for 
the contracting states before they actually become violations, thereby permitting the 
states to anticipate that their laws may one day be called into question.”81 And of 
course, there is reverse signaling as well, because domestic states, by their societal 
evolution away from consensus, effectively maintain space for local variation. As 
Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter have observed, “The conjunction of the 
margin of appreciation doctrine and the consensus inquiry thus permits the ECHR 
to link its decisions to the pace of change of domestic law, acknowledging the 
political sovereignty of respondent states while legitimizing its own decisions against 
them.”82 A similar sort of interaction could be established by a constitutional court 
adopting some form of the classic “concept versus conception” distinction83 with 
regard to the adoption of norms by other actors. Thus, an entity such as the ECHR 
could, for example, articulate a particular concept of rights while recognizing that 
the way this right is implemented is subject to various alternative conceptions. 
Other legal regimes could also usefully adopt margins of appreciation. For 
example, the controversial agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights could be interpreted to incorporate a margin of appreciation.84 Such 
a flexible approach might allow developing countries more leeway in trying to make 
sure that access to knowledge in their countries is not unduly thwarted by overly 
stringent intellectual property protection. 
C.  Subsidiary Schemes 
Subsidiarity is another mechanism for managing the interactions among 
different legal or quasi-legal authorities. The Catholic Church first developed 
subsidiarity as an ordering principle designed to prevent so-called higher levels of 
 
 81. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 78, at 317; see also Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus, Coherence 
and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 133, 141 (1993). See  
J.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 81 (2d ed. 1993) (interpreting the ECHR’s statement in Rees v. United Kingdom, 
App. No. 9532/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56, 68 (1986), that “[t]he need for appropriate legal measures [to 
protect transsexuals] should therefore be kept under review having regard particularly to scientific and 
societal developments” as a “strong hint that while British practice currently satisfied [the Convention], 
the Court’s duty to interpret the Convention as a living instrument may lead it to a different conclusion 
in the future”), for an example of this type of signaling. 
82. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 78, at 317. 
83. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 71 (1986) (discussing the difference between 
“concept” and “conception” as “a contrast between levels of abstraction at which the interpretation of 
the practice can be studied”). 
84. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 
I.L.M. 1197. 
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authority from interfering unduly with the “internal life of a community.”85 But, 
here I am less interested in the idea of pushing decisions to the local level than I am 
in fostering in decision-makers habits of mind that cause careful and repeated 
consideration of other potential lawmaking communities. Thus, “at its core the 
principle of subsidiarity requires any infringements of the autonomy of the local 
level by means of pre-emptive norms enacted on the higher level to be justified by 
good reasons.”86 Accordingly, it is not enough for a national governance rule simply 
to be a good idea; the supranational lawmaking community also must consider 
whether the rule is one that is appropriately enacted at the supranational level, given 
contrary local policies. 
For example, consider the case of a higher-level authority that enacts an 
emissions cap to combat global climate change but runs up against a lower-level 
authority that performed its own cost-benefit analysis and determined that it was 
better for the local economy not to create such a stringent restriction.87 Here, the 
collective action problems inherent in the lower-level authority’s parochial cost-
benefit analysis would probably justify intervention at the higher level. In contrast, 
a higher-level rule limiting nicotine consumption, for example, might not override 
a more permissive local rule because the locality can plausibly decide it wants to 
bear the higher health care costs or other consequences that might result. 
As with all mechanisms for managing pluralism, the line-drawing problems are 
potentially difficult and often politically contested, but even the habits of mind 
generated by thinking in terms of subsidiarity can help ensure that lawmaking 
communities at least take into account other potentially relevant lawmaking 
communities.88 Moreover, subsidiarity can help “local populations . . . better 
 
85. See Catechism of the Catholic Church ¶ 1883, HOLY SEE, http://www.vatican.va/ 
archive/ENG0015/__P6G.HTM [ https://perma.cc/6PY2-Y4Z8] ( last visited June 1, 2018) (“[A] 
community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, 
depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to co-ordinate 
its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good.”) (quoting 
John Paul II, Centesimus Annus ¶ 48 (May 1, 1991), available at http://www.vatican.va/
holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus_ 
en.html#-2S [ https://perma.cc/LM4R-G7DL]). 
 86. Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of 
Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 921 (2004). 
87. See id. at 923–24, for a similar hypothetical example. 
88. I realize that my discussion of subsidiarity has a functionalist cast and therefore may seem 
to deemphasize other concerns, such as democratic legitimacy or the nation-state’s claims to loyalty as 
against supranational institutions. See, e.g., Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and  
the Administrative Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99  
COLUM. L. REV. 628, 669 (1999) (arguing that a functionalist approach “is clearly inadequate to 
understanding the full import of the subsidiarity principle” because it tends to ignore important issues 
of legitimacy); Paul D. Marquardt, Subsidiarity and Sovereignty in the European Union, 18 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 616, 618 (1994) (“[T]he underlying logic of subsidiarity reduces the claim of rightful 
governance to a technocratic question of functional efficiency that will eventually undercut the nation-
state’s claims to loyalty.”). However, the sort of dialogue that mechanisms for managing hybridity 
encourage need not be “technocratic” and can in fact engage with precisely the questions of legitimacy 
and community ties that critics want. Thus, I argue only for mechanisms that enhance dialogue; I do 
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preserve their sense of social and cultural identity”89 while still allowing for the 
possibility that higher-level governmental authority might sometimes be necessary. 
Finally, even though a subsidiarity regime sets the default in favor of local decisions, 
requiring articulated justifications to override the presumption, subsidiarity-related 
concerns can sometimes actually strengthen the perceived legitimacy of the higher-
level authority. This is because, when the higher authority does override local 
regulation, it presumably does so only after carefully considering local practices and 
only after articulating reasons to justify such an override.90 
Accordingly, the institutional processes of subsidiarity aim to ensure dialogue 
among multiple legal communities, leading ideally to increased acceptance of each. 
Not surprisingly, subsidiarity has been proposed as a more general model for 
international law as well.91 Indeed, the complementarity regime of the International 
Criminal Court—whereby the Court only takes jurisdiction if the local state is 
unwilling or unable to investigate92—can be seen as a form of subsidiarity scheme. 
D.  Hybrid Participation Arrangements 
Sometimes pluralism can be addressed not so much through the relationships 
among multiple communities and their decision-makers as through hybridizing the 
decision-making body or process itself. For example, from 1190 until 1870, English 
law used the so-called mixed jury, or jury de medietate linguae, with members of two 
different communities sitting side by side to settle disputes when people from the 
two communities came into conflict.93 Sir Edward Coke attributed this practice “to 
the Saxons, for whom ‘twelve men versed in the law, six English and an equal 
number of Welsh, dispense justice to the English and Welsh.’”94 Regional 
differences, however, were not the only type of community variation recognized in 
the mixed-jury custom. Mixed juries were also used in disputes between Jews and 
 
not circumscribe the content of that dialogue. Nevertheless, to the extent that critics of a functionalist 
account of subsidiarity are trying to raise a sovereigntist objection to supranationalism in general, the 
pluralist framework I pursue here clearly rejects such a position as both normatively undesirable and 
impractical. See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European 
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 341 (1994). 
 89. See Bermann, supra note 88. 
 90. See Kumm, supra note 86, at 922 (“If there are good reasons for deciding an issue on the 
international level, because the concerns addressed are concerns best addressed by a larger community, 
then the international level enjoys greater jurisdictional legitimacy.”). 
91. See, e.g., id. at 921–22. 
92. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1002, 
1012. 
93. Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury De Medietate 
Linguae: A History and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. REV. 777, 781 (1994); see also MARIANNE 
CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY AND CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF 
CITIZENSHIP, LAW, AND KNOWLEDGE 7–8 (1994) (explaining the practice of mixed juries in early 
England). 
94. CONSTABLE, supra note 93, at 17 (referencing SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF 
THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 234 (1628)). 
First to Printer_Berman (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2018  10:42 AM 
174 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:149 
Christians,95 city and country dwellers,96 and merchants and nonmerchants.97 In the 
United States, the custom of mixed juries was imported from England and used in 
disputes between settlers and indigenous people,98 as well as in other 
interjurisdictional disputes at least through the beginning of the twentieth century.99 
Karl Llewellyn’s proposal that merchant experts sit as a tribunal to hear commercial 
disputes relies on a similar idea that specialized communities may possess relevant 
knowledge or background that should be called upon in rendering just verdicts.100 
The principles underlying mixed juries can still be found today. Indeed, the 
line of U.S. Supreme Court decisions involving peremptory challenges of jurors, 
though framed in terms of the individual right to serve on a jury, could be seen as 
responding in part to the broader idea that jury panels should reflect both racial and 
gender diversity.101 Indeed, research indicates that racially mixed juries tend to 
deliberate longer, consider more facts, raise more questions, and discuss more racial 
issues than all-white juries.102 
In the human rights arena, hybrid domestic/international courts maintain the 
tradition of the mixed jury.103 Such hybrid courts have been employed in transitional 
justice settings in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia.104 In these 
courts, domestic judges—ideally drawn from the multiple political, racial, or ethnic 
groups involved in the larger geopolitical conflict—sit alongside international 
 
95. See CONSTABLE, supra note 93, at 18–21 (noting that half-Jewish, half-Christian juries heard 
suits between Jews and non-Jews in England during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries); Ramirez, supra 
note 93, at 783–84 (arguing that mixed juries originated in part from the king’s desire to protect Jewish 
capital, which was subject to high assessments and escheatment to the Crown, rather than lose it to 
Christians in an unfair trial ). 
 96. See CONSTABLE, supra note 93, at 17 (recounting an action involving a country dweller in 
twelfth-century London that required that at least one of the jurors be of “the county in which the 
foreigner dwells”). 
97. See id. at 23–25 (exploring the evolution of “mixed merchant juries” in early England); 
Ramirez, supra note 93, at 784–86 (recognizing the king’s regard for foreign merchants, which prompted 
the use of mixed juries in order to promote a “perception of fairness” to outsiders and attract their 
capital and goods). 
 98. See Katherine A. Hermes, Jurisdiction in the Colonial Northeast: Algonquian, English and 
French Governance, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 52, 64–65 (1999) (discussing the implementation of a mixed-
jury system in colonial Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts). 
99. See Ramirez, supra note 93, at 790 (noting that “[a]t various times between 1674 and 1911, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, Virginia, and South Carolina each 
provided for mixed juries”). 
100. See Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant 
Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 512–15 (1987) (describing Llewellyn’s merchant tribunal proposal). 
101. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (ruling that prosecutors may not challenge 
jurors solely on the basis of race); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1994) (extending Batson to 
peremptory challenges based on gender). 
102. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race 
and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1028 (2003). 
103. See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295 (2003) 
(discussing hybrid courts generally and their attempts to provide mixed panels of judges to hear cases). 
104. Id. at 295. 
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judges, and domestic and international lawyers also work together to prosecute the 
cases.105 
As Stephen Krasner has theorized, the sort of “shared sovereignty”106 
reflected in the hybrid court structure can be particularly important when domestic 
institutions are weak. He argues that shared sovereignty can “gird new political 
structures with more expertise, better-crafted policies, and guarantees against abuses 
of power.”107 Following this logic, the Dayton Accords effectively made the 
Bosnian Constitutional Court a hybrid court, authorizing the president of the 
European Court of Human Rights to appoint three non-Bosnian judges to the nine-
member court.108 A different kind of hybrid is the Israeli Supreme Court, which has, 
since its inception, customarily had at least one member who is an expert in Jewish 
law.109 
We can also see hybrid arrangements outside the judicial context. For example, 
in the 2000 oil pipeline agreement between Chad and the World Bank, the two 
parties arranged to share control and governance of the project.110 As a condition 
for its participation, the World Bank insisted on a revenue management plan aimed 
at ensuring that the proceeds of oil extraction would be used for socioeconomic 
development.111 To that end, the plan contained important limitations on how the 
expected oil revenue could be invested and spent.112 In addition, oversight of the 
revenue plan was shared. Both the World Bank and the government of Chad had 
to approve the annual expenditure of revenues, and there was a nine-member 
oversight committee, seven of whom represented the government while two 
 
105. See id. 
106. Stephen D. Krasner, Building Democracy After Conflict: The Case for Shared Sovereignty, 16 
J. DEMOCRACY 69, 76 (2005) (“Shared sovereignty involves the creation of institutions for governing 
specific issue areas within a state—areas over which external and internal actors voluntarily share 
authority.”). 
 107. Id. at 70. 
108. See General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, 
annex 4, art. VI, ¶ 1(a), Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75. 
109. See, e.g., Donna E. Arzt, Growing a Constitution: Reconciling Liberty and Community in Israel 
and the United States, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 253, 257 (1994). 
110. See Emeka Duruigbo, The World Bank, Multinational Oil Corporations, and the Resource 
Curse in Africa, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 38–46 (2005), for a useful description of the terms of 
the project. 
111. See id. at 40. 
112. See id. at 41–42 (“In the course of the first ten years of production, that is, between 2004 
and 2013, income taxes will constitute sixteen percent of total revenues to Chad and the rest will come 
from royalties and dividends. The government is given discretion on how to spend the revenues from 
income taxes subject to the limitation that they be used for general development purposes. The 
government has less liberty when it comes to royalties and dividends. A Special Revenue Account is 
created in which they would be deposited. A distribution formula has also been specified. Ten percent 
of the money will be kept in international financial institutions as a fund for future generations. Eighty-
five percent of the remaining ninety percent will be deposited in local commercial banks and is 
dedicated to the financing of programs in five important sectors namely, education, health and social 
services, rural development, infrastructure, and environment and water resources. The remaining 
fifteen percent would be devoted to the development of the oil-producing Doba region.”). 
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represented civil society.113 The committee annually published a review of 
operations, and those operations were subject to external audit.114 Finally, the World 
Bank’s International Advisory Group and Inspection Panel retained oversight 
power over the entire venture.115 The result was a hybrid governance structure, 
neither fully international nor fully domestic. 
E. Jurisdictional Redundancies 
Many of the legal conundrums of a hybrid world arise because of jurisdictional 
redundancy. That is because multiple legal communities frequently seek to assert 
jurisdiction over the same act or actor. Yet, while this jurisdictional overlap is 
frequently viewed as a problem because it potentially creates conflicting obligations 
and uncertainty, we might also view jurisdictional redundancy as a necessary 
adaptive feature of a multivariate, pluralist legal system. Indeed, jurisdictional 
redundancy may itself be thought of as a mechanism for managing pluralism 
because the existence of overlapping jurisdictional claims often leads to a nuanced 
negotiation—either explicit or implicit—between or among the various 
communities making those claims. 
In focusing on the pluralist opportunities inherent in jurisdictional 
redundancy, I echo the insights of Robert Cover in his article, The Uses of 
Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation.116 Although his essay was 
focused particularly on the variety of “official” law pronouncers in the U.S. federal 
system, Cover identified some of the benefits that accrue from having multiple 
overlapping jurisdictional assertions, regardless of the context.117 Such benefits 
include a greater possibility for error correction, a more robust field for norm 
articulation, and a larger space for creative innovation.118 And though Cover 
acknowledged that it might seem perverse “to seek out a messy and indeterminate 
end to conflicts which may be tied neatly together by a single authoritative verdict,” 
he nevertheless argued that we should “embrace” a system “that permits the 
tensions and conflicts of the social order” to be played out in the jurisdictional 
structure of the system.119 Thus, Cover’s pluralism, though here focused on  
U.S. federalism, can be said to include the creative possibilities inherent in multiple 
overlapping jurisdictions asserted by both state and non-state entities in whatever 
context they arise. 
 
113. Id. at 42. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 
22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981). 
117. See id. at 642. 
118. See id. at 649. 
119. Id. at 682. 
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More recently, Judith Resnik has noted the “multiple ports of entry” that a 
federalist system creates120 and has argued that what constitutes the appropriate 
spheres for “local,” “national,” and “international” regulation and adjudication 
changes over time and should not be essentialized.121 Not surprisingly, other 
commentators have at times advocated what amounts to a federalist approach to 
national/supranational relations. 
F. Migration, Assimilation, and Integration 
Finally, no discussion of legal pluralism as a normative project would be 
complete without at least surfacing the pressing contemporary issue of the 
migration of peoples across borders and the stresses caused by such migration. 
Here, it seems to me that law has a potentially vital role to play as a forum for 
communication across difference. Indeed, Carol Greenhouse, Barbara Yngvesson, 
and David Engel, in their study of law and community in three American towns, 
observed that law is often the terrain of engagement that is used as communities 
diversify.122 In a more homogenous community, where people share history, race, 
ethnicity, clan ties, social, and religious affiliations, more informal social control 
mechanisms are available. Transgressors can be shamed and gossiped about, 
community elders or social leaders can be enlisted to pull people back in line, and 
so on. But as immigrants enter such communities, those informal dispute resolution 
mechanisms are less available, and so formal legal processes become more essential. 
From this perspective, it is perhaps not surprising that law and legal process are so 
central to U.S. culture; as a society built through wave upon wave of immigration, 
law was needed as a space to turn enemies into adversaries. 
One of the strengths of law as a forum for negotiating difference is that, at 
least in its ideal state, law can allow for the sort of unassimilated otherness Young 
envisions. Different narratives and perspectives can be heard, and though power 
dynamics and entrenched hierarchies still matter, they can, at least sometimes, be 
overcome. Certainly, law speaks its own language, and people may need to translate 
their voices into that language in order to be heard. Yet, as discussed previously, the 
many ports of entry for legal arguments can allow people to gain leverage they might 
not otherwise have had. 
For example, as late as 1994, women in Hong Kong were unable to inherit 
land.123 That year, a group of rural indigenous women joined forces with urban 
 
 120. See Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and 
Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006). 
121. See Judith Resnik, Afterword: Federalism’s Options, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 465, 473–74 
(1996) (“My point is not only that particular subject matter may go back and forth between state and 
federal governance but also that the tradition of allocation itself is one constantly being reworked; 
periodically, events prompt the revisiting of state or federal authority, and the lines move.”). 
122. See generally CAROL J. GREENHOUSE ET AL., LAW AND COMMUNITY IN THREE AMERICAN 
TOWNS (1994). 
123. Sally Engel Merry & Rachel E. Stern, The Female Inheritance Movement in Hong Kong: 
Theorizing the Local/Global Interface, 46 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 387, 387 (2005). 
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women’s groups to demand legal change.124 As detailed by Sally Engle Merry and 
Rachel Stern, “The indigenous women slowly shifted from seeing their stories as 
individual kinship violations to broader examples of discrimination.”125 Ultimately, 
the women learned to protest these unjust customary laws in the language of 
international human rights and gender equality.126 Having done so, they were 
successful at getting the inheritance rules overturned.127 While we might regret the 
fact that these women were forced to “translate” their grievances into an 
internationally recognized language in order to be heard, the success of the 
movement in accessing political power surely attests to the strength and importance 
of the international law discourse to their ability to gain a foothold for their claims. 
Beyond formal legal process, it may be that the normative ideas underlying 
legal pluralism can provide responses to the stresses caused by migration more 
generally. First, of course, pluralism teaches that the whole idea of diversity and 
otherness need not be seen as a threat to be feared and repelled, but can instead be 
embraced and cherished. Second, pluralism suggests an alternative response to 
immigration that is neither full-on assimilation nor exclusion or segregation. By 
focusing on engagement across difference, communities can honor those 
differences without dissolving them, while also creating opportunities for 
integration. 
For example, a more pluralist perspective might suggest that France and other 
countries have gone too far in excluding all symbols of religion in public arenas, 
such as schools. The goal of creating a secular space for civic engagement may be 
laudable, but such engagement may actually be more robust if people retain the 
signifiers of their individual and group identities and engage across difference rather 
than masquerade in an enforced sameness. On the other hand, encouraging (or even 
requiring) immigrants to learn the languages of their new communities so that they 
can participate in a shared social life may be useful. In any event, pluralism as a 
normative project provides a crucial set of tools for balancing the sometimes 
conflicting imperatives of maintaining diversity and encouraging integration. 
VI. CAN GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM BE NORMATIVE AND STILL BE PLURALIST? 
As noted at the outset, global legal pluralism builds upon earlier scholarship 
focused on legal pluralism in more localized settings. Scholars such as Sally Falk 
Moore, Leopold Pospisil, Franz and Keebet von Benda Beckmann, Marc Galanter, 
John Griffiths and Sally Merry turned to legal pluralism as a critique of liberal 
legality.128 And, true to this political agenda, these scholars were skeptical about the 
hegemonic impact caused by the framing discourse of law itself. They fought against 
a de-historicized, hierarchical vision of the law that allowed the takeover of the legal 
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127. Id. at 394. 
128. See generally Berman, supra note 2 (providing an overview of legal pluralism scholarship). 
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field by state institutions. And they were thus acutely aware that legal pluralism was 
a radical challenge to the presumed power of official state systems. 
Accordingly, one potential concern about global legal pluralism as a normative 
project is that it will lose this edge of radical critique. In an attempt to be more 
practically useful, this sort of normative stance might alter legal pluralism such that 
it becomes less self-suspicious about the hegemony of liberal legal discourse, 
procedures, and institutions, and instead falls back on such liberal legality in 
pursuing practical solutions.129 
This argument is a useful one, and I think it is correct as far as it goes. But that 
only means that the evolution of global legal pluralism may be on a different 
trajectory from the original legal pluralists. Indeed, the context and aims of global 
legal pluralism as a normative project are very different from those of classic legal 
pluralism. As noted previously, the classic legal pluralists were principally engaged 
in critique of a dominant view of legality, and they were doing it primarily from the 
perspective of providing thicker description of cultural practices. 
In contrast, global legal pluralism as a normative project is actually trying to 
advocate a plausible set of institutional arrangements and procedural mechanisms 
in order to make dominant legal and governmental entities more pluralist in 
orientation. That is a very different starting point, and it is therefore not surprising 
that scholars engaged in this normative project do indeed tend to embrace aspects 
of liberal legality as a given. Thus, it is undoubtedly true that the new generation of 
global legal pluralists has not severed ties with classic state-based legal theory (and 
its limits), but it is also true that this new generation is no longer aiming to completely 
sever such ties in the name of radical critique; scholars are instead trying to introduce 
more pluralist frameworks into hegemonic structures to make them more 
accommodating to diversity and hybridity. And that means there will be limitations 
on the range of hybridity, the language used, and the sorts of arguments entertained. 
But, these scholars would argue, the result is still better than if no pluralism had 
been introduced into the framework at all. 
Some may not agree. They may say that it’s not a truly pluralist vision unless 
it goes all the way and rejects (or at least challenges) the discourse of law itself. It is 
fine to make that argument. But I think such critics should at least also acknowledge 
that such a position makes it difficult to put forward a practical program with a 
chance of being implemented in a state-based world. In sum, global legal pluralism 
as a normative project is not an unselfconscious adoption of hegemonic 
frameworks, but a conscious choice to participate in a discourse about institutional 
design that otherwise would not be available without adopting certain assumptions 
and conventions. 
And especially at this crucial juncture in history, I think scholars need to spend 
more time justifying liberal legality and supporting it against the antidemocratic forces 
 
129. See, e.g., Mariano Croce & Marco Goldoni, A Sense of Self-Suspicion: Global Legal Pluralism 
and the Claim to Legal Authority, 8 ETHICS & GLOBAL POL. 1 (2015) (advancing this argument). 
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that are circling the globe, rather than focusing on radical critique. There is simply 
too much at stake. Therefore, even if it dilutes the pluralist vision to justify particular 
structures of governance, this strikes me as a worthwhile trade-off if the result is a 
fully voiced justification for a governmental order that at least aims for increased 
dialogue across difference. 
Does this evolution mean that normative legal pluralism is not truly pluralism 
at all? Certainly the new variants of legal pluralism are less engaged in radical critique 
and so are willing to countenance liberal legal hegemony even while seeking to open 
more space for alternative voices within the framework. And, of course, pluralists 
recognize that whatever governance institutions one creates, they will immediately 
be challenged, resisted, and subverted in actual practice. But that doesn’t mean that 
those institutional design choices have no impact, and therefore it may be worth 
thinking about how to make better ones. Thus, it is fair and appropriate to criticize 
a more normative stance or caution against expecting too much from any particular 
institutional change. But I think it is unduly doctrinaire and closed-minded to say 
that such approaches cannot rightly call themselves pluralist or draw on an earlier 
tradition, even if that tradition were somewhat different. The nature of scholarly 
threads is that an idea put forth in one context and with one aim can be appropriated 
and developed in another context for slightly different purposes. And of all people, 
pluralists should understand that.  
Thus, we can perhaps criticize global legal pluralism as a normative project for 
not being sufficiently counter-hegemonic, but as we do so, we need to first 
acknowledge that the goals (and institutional roles) of the project are fundamentally 
different from the original legal pluralist project, which accounts for much of the 
difference. Second, global legal pluralism as a normative project may often be 
consistent with liberalism even though it is a structurally different framework; there 
is no lack of self-consciousness or self-suspicion in that. And, third, we must 
understand that whether or not a normative stance is somehow inappropriate is not 
for a purist scholarly gatekeeper to regulate; ideas morph in plural ways, and the 
vision of global legal pluralism as a normative project may simply be just one of the 
many plural variants of pluralism, which is as it should be. 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, the key question for me is: what sorts of institutional designs, 
procedural mechanisms, and discursive practices have the best chance of providing 
effective communication across difference and therefore the best chance of creating 
a shared social space that might help turn enemies into adversaries? Such 
approaches need not be perfect and certainly will never be total, but that doesn’t 
mean they can’t be helpful and effective. If European institutions, by balancing 
nation-state sovereignty and supranational authority, have actually contributed to a 
period of prosperity and peace unrivaled in the entire history of Europe, then those 
institutions need defending, particularly when they are under attack. If diversity and 
immigration tend to create long-term societal benefits and lessen extreme 
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deprivation of human rights, then someone needs to advocate systems that embrace 
those values. Of course, no set of legal rules or institutions could ever fully solve 
the problems of the world, but it seems to me that institutions and practices that 
seek to manage without eliminating pluralism are better at creating the necessary 
shared social space for communication across difference, and are therefore better 
than the available alternatives. And legal pluralists, because of their profound 
understanding of contestation, diversity, multiplicity, and hybridity, are well 
positioned to contribute to these and other debates if they choose to do so. 
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